| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age |
|---|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
A 'void *' argument suggests that the caller might pass an arbitrary
struct, which is appropriate for functions like libc's read/write, or
pq_sendbytes(). 'uint8 *' is more appropriate for byte arrays that
have no structure, like the cancellation keys or SCRAM tokens. Some
places used 'char *', but 'uint8 *' is better because 'char *' is
commonly used for null-terminated strings. Change code around SCRAM,
MD5 authentication, and cancellation key handling to follow these
conventions.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/61be9e31-7b7d-49d5-bc11-721800d89d64@eisentraut.org
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Setting the iteration count for SCRAM secret generation to INT_MAX
will cause an infinite loop in scram_SaltedPassword() due to integer
overflow, as the loop uses the "i <= iterations" comparison. To fix,
use "i < iterations" instead.
Back-patch to v16 where the user-settable GUC scram_iterations has
been added.
Author: Kevin K Biju <kevinkbiju@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Guo <guofenglinux@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAM45KeEMm8hnxdTOxA98qhfZ9CzGDdgy3mxgJmy0c+2WwjA6Zg@mail.gmail.com
|
| |
|
|
| |
Backpatch-through: 13
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This routine documented that "iterations" would use a default value if
set to 0 by the caller. However, the iteration should always be set by
the caller to a value strictly more than 0, as documented by an
assertion.
Oversight in b577743000cd, that has made the iteration count of SCRAM
configurable.
Author: Matheus Alcantara
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/ac858943-4743-44cd-b4ad-08a0c10cbbc8@gmail.com
Backpatch-through: 16
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Reported-by: Michael Paquier
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/ZZKTDPxBBMt3C0J9@paquier.xyz
Backpatch-through: 12
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
scram_SaltedPassword() could take a long time to compute when the number
of iterations used is large enough, and this code uses a tight loop to
compute a salted password.
Note that the same issue exists in libpq when using \password and a
large iteration number, but this cannot be interrupted. A CFI in the
backend is useful for server-side computations, at least.
Backpatch down to 16, where the user-settable GUC scram_iterations has
been added.
Author: Bowen Shi
Reviewed-by: Aleksander Alekseev, Daniel Gustafsson
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAM_vCueV6xfr08KczfaCEk5J_qeTZtgqN7+orkNLx=g+phE82Q@mail.gmail.com
Backpatch-through: 16
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Replace the hardcoded value with a GUC such that the iteration
count can be raised in order to increase protection against
brute-force attacks. The hardcoded value for SCRAM iteration
count was defined to be 4096, which is taken from RFC 7677, so
set the default for the GUC to 4096 to match. In RFC 7677 the
recommendation is at least 15000 iterations but 4096 is listed
as a SHOULD requirement given that it's estimated to yield a
0.5s processing time on a mobile handset of the time of RFC
writing (late 2015).
Raising the iteration count of SCRAM will make stored passwords
more resilient to brute-force attacks at a higher computational
cost during connection establishment. Lowering the count will
reduce computational overhead during connections at the tradeoff
of reducing strength against brute-force attacks.
There are however platforms where even a modest iteration count
yields a too high computational overhead, with weaker password
encryption schemes chosen as a result. In these situations,
SCRAM with a very low iteration count still gives benefits over
weaker schemes like md5, so we allow the iteration count to be
set to one at the low end.
The new GUC is intentionally generically named such that it can
be made to support future SCRAM standards should they emerge.
At that point the value can be made into key:value pairs with
an undefined key as a default which will be backwards compatible
with this.
Reviewed-by: Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan S. Katz <jkatz@postgresql.org>
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/F72E7BC7-189F-4B17-BF47-9735EB72C364@yesql.se
|
| |
|
|
| |
Backpatch-through: 11
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
SCRAM_KEY_LEN was a variable used in the internal routines of SCRAM to
size a set of fixed-sized arrays used in the SHA and HMAC computations
during the SASL exchange or when building a SCRAM password. This had a
hard dependency on SHA-256, reducing the flexibility of SCRAM when it
comes to the addition of more hash methods. A second issue was that
SHA-256 is assumed as the cryptohash method to use all the time.
This commit renames SCRAM_KEY_LEN to a more generic SCRAM_KEY_MAX_LEN,
which is used as the size of the buffers used by the internal routines
of SCRAM. This is aimed at tracking centrally the maximum size
necessary for all the hash methods supported by SCRAM. A global
variable has the advantage of keeping the code in its simplest form,
reducing the need of more alloc/free logic for all the buffers used in
the hash calculations.
A second change is that the key length (SHA digest length) and hash
types are now tracked by the state data in the backend and the frontend,
the common portions being extended to handle these as arguments by the
internal routines of SCRAM. There are a few RFC proposals floating
around to extend the SCRAM protocol, including some to use stronger
cryptohash algorithms, so this lifts some of the existing restrictions
in the code.
The code in charge of parsing and building SCRAM secrets is extended to
rely on the key length and on the cryptohash type used for the exchange,
assuming currently that only SHA-256 is supported for the moment. Note
that the mock authentication simply enforces SHA-256.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Peter Eisentraut, Jonathan Katz
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/Y5k3Qiweo/1g9CG6@paquier.xyz
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This is similar to b69aba7, except that this completes the work for
HMAC with a new routine called pg_hmac_error() that would provide more
context about the type of error that happened during a HMAC computation:
- The fallback HMAC implementation in hmac.c relies on cryptohashes, so
in some code paths it is necessary to return back the error generated by
cryptohashes.
- For the OpenSSL implementation (hmac_openssl.c), the logic is very
similar to cryptohash_openssl.c, where the error context comes from
OpenSSL if one of its internal routines failed, with different error
codes if something internal to hmac_openssl.c failed or was incorrect.
Any in-core code paths that use the centralized HMAC interface are
related to SCRAM, for errors that are unlikely going to happen, with
only SHA-256. It would be possible to see errors when computing some
HMACs with MD5 for example and OpenSSL FIPS enabled, and this commit
would help in reporting the correct errors but nothing in core uses
that. So, at the end, no backpatch to v14 is done, at least for now.
Errors in SCRAM related to the computation of the server key, stored
key, etc. need to pass down the potential error context string across
more layers of their respective call stacks for the frontend and the
backend, so each surrounding routine is adapted for this purpose.
Reviewed-by: Sergey Shinderuk
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/Yd0N9tSAIIkFd+qi@paquier.xyz
|
| |
|
|
| |
Backpatch-through: 10
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Similarly to the cryptohash implementations, this refactors the existing
HMAC code into a single set of APIs that can be plugged with any crypto
libraries PostgreSQL is built with (only OpenSSL currently). If there
is no such libraries, a fallback implementation is available. Those new
APIs are designed similarly to the existing cryptohash layer, so there
is no real new design here, with the same logic around buffer bound
checks and memory handling.
HMAC has a dependency on cryptohashes, so all the cryptohash types
supported by cryptohash{_openssl}.c can be used with HMAC. This
refactoring is an advantage mainly for SCRAM, that included its own
implementation of HMAC with SHA256 without relying on the existing
crypto libraries even if PostgreSQL was built with their support.
This code has been tested on Windows and Linux, with and without
OpenSSL, across all the versions supported on HEAD from 1.1.1 down to
1.0.1. I have also checked that the implementations are working fine
using some sample results, a custom extension of my own, and doing
cross-checks across different major versions with SCRAM with the client
and the backend.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Bruce Momjian
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/X9m0nkEJEzIPXjeZ@paquier.xyz
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
With its current design, a careless use of pg_cryptohash_final() could
would result in an out-of-bound write in memory as the size of the
destination buffer to store the result digest is not known to the
cryptohash internals, without the caller knowing about that. This
commit adds a new argument to pg_cryptohash_final() to allow such sanity
checks, and implements such defenses.
The internals of SCRAM for HMAC could be tightened a bit more, but as
everything is based on SCRAM_KEY_LEN with uses particular to this code
there is no need to complicate its interface more than necessary, and
this comes back to the refactoring of HMAC in core. Except that, this
minimizes the uses of the existing DIGEST_LENGTH variables, relying
instead on sizeof() for the result sizes. In ossp-uuid, this also makes
the code more defensive, as it already relied on dce_uuid_t being at
least the size of a MD5 digest.
This is in philosophy similar to cfc40d3 for base64.c and aef8948 for
hex.c.
Reported-by: Ranier Vilela
Author: Michael Paquier, Ranier Vilela
Reviewed-by: Kyotaro Horiguchi
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAEudQAoqEGmcff3J4sTSV-R_16Monuz-UpJFbf_dnVH=APr02Q@mail.gmail.com
|
| |
|
|
| |
Backpatch-through: 9.5
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Two new routines to allocate a hash context and to free it are created,
as these become necessary for the goal behind this refactoring: switch
the all cryptohash implementations for OpenSSL to use EVP (for FIPS and
also because upstream does not recommend the use of low-level cryptohash
functions for 20 years). Note that OpenSSL hides the internals of
cryptohash contexts since 1.1.0, so it is necessary to leave the
allocation to OpenSSL itself, explaining the need for those two new
routines. This part is going to require more work to properly track
hash contexts with resource owners, but this not introduced here.
Still, this refactoring makes the move possible.
This reduces the number of routines for all SHA2 implementations from
twelve (SHA{224,256,386,512} with init, update and final calls) to five
(create, free, init, update and final calls) by incorporating the hash
type directly into the hash context data.
The new cryptohash routines are moved to a new file, called cryptohash.c
for the fallback implementations, with SHA2 specifics becoming a part
internal to src/common/. OpenSSL specifics are part of
cryptohash_openssl.c. This infrastructure is usable for more hash
types, like MD5 or HMAC.
Any code paths using the internal SHA2 routines are adapted to report
correctly errors, which are most of the changes of this commit. The
zones mostly impacted are checksum manifests, libpq and SCRAM.
Note that e21cbb4 was a first attempt to switch SHA2 to EVP, but it
lacked the refactoring needed for libpq, as done here.
This patch has been tested on Linux and Windows, with and without
OpenSSL, and down to 1.0.1, the oldest version supported on HEAD.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Daniel Gustafsson
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20200924025314.GE7405@paquier.xyz
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Includes some manual cleanup of places that pgindent messed up,
most of which weren't per project style anyway.
Notably, it seems some people didn't absorb the style rules of
commit c9d297751, because there were a bunch of new occurrences
of function calls with a newline just after the left paren, all
with faulty expectations about how the rest of the call would get
indented.
|
| |
|
|
| |
Backpatch-through: update all files in master, backpatch legal files through 9.4
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Within the context of SCRAM, "verifier" has a specific meaning in the
protocol, per RFCs. The existing code used "verifier" differently, to
mean whatever is or would be stored in pg_auth.rolpassword.
Fix this by using the term "secret" for this, following RFC 5803.
Reviewed-by: Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/flat/be397b06-6e4b-ba71-c7fb-54cae84a7e18%402ndquadrant.com
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This is a follow-up refactoring after 09ec55b and b674211, which has
proved that the encoding and decoding routines used by SCRAM have a
poor interface when it comes to check after buffer overflows. This adds
an extra argument in the shape of the length of the result buffer for
each routine, which is used for overflow checks when encoding or
decoding an input string. The original idea comes from Tom Lane.
As a result of that, the encoding routine can now fail, so all its
callers are adjusted to generate proper error messages in case of
problems.
On failure, the result buffer gets zeroed.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Daniel Gustafsson
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20190623132535.GB1628@paquier.xyz
|
| |
|
|
| |
Backpatch-through: certain files through 9.4
|
| |
|
|
| |
Backpatch-through: certain files through 9.3
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
All postgres internal usages are replaced, it's just libpq example
usages that haven't been converted. External users of libpq can't
generally rely on including postgres internal headers.
Note that this includes replacing open-coded byte swapping of 64bit
integers (using two 32 bit swaps) with a single 64bit swap.
Where it looked applicable, I have removed netinet/in.h and
arpa/inet.h usage, which previously provided the relevant
functionality. It's perfectly possible that I missed other reasons for
including those, the buildfarm will tell.
Author: Andres Freund
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20170927172019.gheidqy6xvlxb325@alap3.anarazel.de
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Change pg_bsd_indent to follow upstream rules for placement of comments
to the right of code, and remove pgindent hack that caused comments
following #endif to not obey the general rule.
Commit e3860ffa4dd0dad0dd9eea4be9cc1412373a8c89 wasn't actually using
the published version of pg_bsd_indent, but a hacked-up version that
tried to minimize the amount of movement of comments to the right of
code. The situation of interest is where such a comment has to be
moved to the right of its default placement at column 33 because there's
code there. BSD indent has always moved right in units of tab stops
in such cases --- but in the previous incarnation, indent was working
in 8-space tab stops, while now it knows we use 4-space tabs. So the
net result is that in about half the cases, such comments are placed
one tab stop left of before. This is better all around: it leaves
more room on the line for comment text, and it means that in such
cases the comment uniformly starts at the next 4-space tab stop after
the code, rather than sometimes one and sometimes two tabs after.
Also, ensure that comments following #endif are indented the same
as comments following other preprocessor commands such as #else.
That inconsistency turns out to have been self-inflicted damage
from a poorly-thought-through post-indent "fixup" in pgindent.
This patch is much less interesting than the first round of indent
changes, but also bulkier, so I thought it best to separate the effects.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/E1dAmxK-0006EE-1r@gemulon.postgresql.org
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/30527.1495162840@sss.pgh.pa.us
|
| |
|
|
| |
perltidy run not included.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Reformat various places in which pgindent will make a mess, and
fix a few small violations of coding style that I happened to notice
while perusing the diffs from a pgindent dry run.
There is one actual bug fix here: the need-to-enlarge-the-buffer code
path in icu_convert_case was obviously broken. Perhaps it's unreachable
in our usage? Or maybe this is just sadly undertested.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The new function supports creating SCRAM verifiers, in addition to md5
hashes. The algorithm is chosen based on password_encryption, by default.
This fixes the issue reported by Jeff Janes, that there was previously
no way to create a SCRAM verifier with "\password".
Michael Paquier and me
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAMkU%3D1wfBgFPbfAMYZQE78p%3DVhZX7nN86aWkp0QcCp%3D%2BKxZ%3Dbg%40mail.gmail.com
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
* Move computation of SaltedPassword to a separate function from
scram_ClientOrServerKey(). This saves a lot of cycles in libpq, by
computing SaltedPassword only once per authentication. (Computing
SaltedPassword is expensive by design.)
* Split scram_ClientOrServerKey() into two functions. Improves
readability, by making the calling code less verbose.
* Rename "server proof" to "server signature", to better match the
nomenclature used in RFC 5802.
* Rename SCRAM_SALT_LEN to SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN, to make it more clear
that the salt can be of any length, and the constant only specifies how
long a salt we use when we generate a new verifier. Also rename
SCRAM_ITERATIONS_DEFAULT to SCRAM_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS, for consistency.
These things caught my eye while working on other upcoming changes.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
An important step of SASLprep normalization, is to convert the string to
Unicode normalization form NFKC. Unicode normalization requires a fairly
large table of character decompositions, which is generated from data
published by the Unicode consortium. The script to generate the table is
put in src/common/unicode, as well test code for the normalization.
A pre-generated version of the tables is included in src/include/common,
so you don't need the code in src/common/unicode to build PostgreSQL, only
if you wish to modify the normalization tables.
The SASLprep implementation depends on the UTF-8 functions from
src/backend/utils/mb/wchar.c. So to use it, you must also compile and link
that. That doesn't change anything for the current users of these
functions, the backend and libpq, as they both already link with wchar.o.
It would be good to move those functions into a separate file in
src/commmon, but I'll leave that for another day.
No documentation changes included, because there is no details on the
SCRAM mechanism in the docs anyway. An overview on that in the protocol
specification would probably be good, even though SCRAM is documented in
detail in RFC5802. I'll write that as a separate patch. An important thing
to mention there is that we apply SASLprep even on invalid UTF-8 strings,
to support other encodings.
Patch by Michael Paquier and me.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqSByyEmAVLtEf1KxTRh=PWNKiWKEKQR=e1yGehz=wbymQ@mail.gmail.com
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
* Add required #includes for htonl. Per buildfarm members pademelon/gaur.
* Remove unnecessary "#include <utils/memutils>".
* Fix checking for empty string in pg_SASL_init. (Reported by Peter
Eisentraut and his compiler)
* Move code in pg_SASL_init to match the recent changes (commit ba005f193d)
to pg_fe_sendauth() function, where it's copied from.
* Return value of malloc() was not checked for NULL in
scram_SaltedPassword(). Fix by avoiding the malloc().
|
| |
|
|
| |
Amit Kapila.
|
|
|
This introduces a new generic SASL authentication method, similar to the
GSS and SSPI methods. The server first tells the client which SASL
authentication mechanism to use, and then the mechanism-specific SASL
messages are exchanged in AuthenticationSASLcontinue and PasswordMessage
messages. Only SCRAM-SHA-256 is supported at the moment, but this allows
adding more SASL mechanisms in the future, without changing the overall
protocol.
Support for channel binding, aka SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS is left for later.
The SASLPrep algorithm, for pre-processing the password, is not yet
implemented. That could cause trouble, if you use a password with
non-ASCII characters, and a client library that does implement SASLprep.
That will hopefully be added later.
Authorization identities, as specified in the SCRAM-SHA-256 specification,
are ignored. SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION provides more or less the same
functionality, anyway.
If a user doesn't exist, perform a "mock" authentication, by constructing
an authentic-looking challenge on the fly. The challenge is derived from
a new system-wide random value, "mock authentication nonce", which is
created at initdb, and stored in the control file. We go through these
motions, in order to not give away the information on whether the user
exists, to unauthenticated users.
Bumps PG_CONTROL_VERSION, because of the new field in control file.
Patch by Michael Paquier and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed at different
stages by Robert Haas, Stephen Frost, David Steele, Aleksander Alekseev,
and many others.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRbR3GmFYdedCAhzukfKrgBLTLtMvENOmPrVWREsZkF8g%40mail.gmail.com
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqSMXU35g%3DW9X74HVeQp0uvgJxvYOuA4A-A3M%2B0wfEBv-w%40mail.gmail.com
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/55192AFE.6080106@iki.fi
|
