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-rw-r--r--src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c1468
1 files changed, 1468 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..f950fc3bc3c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1468 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * fe-secure-openssl.c
+ * OpenSSL support
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2014, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c
+ *
+ * NOTES
+ *
+ * We don't provide informational callbacks here (like
+ * info_cb() in be-secure.c), since there's no good mechanism to
+ * display such information to the user.
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+#include "libpq-fe.h"
+#include "fe-auth.h"
+#include "libpq-int.h"
+
+#ifdef WIN32
+#include "win32.h"
+#else
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_TCP_H
+#include <netinet/tcp.h>
+#endif
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_THREAD_SAFETY
+#ifdef WIN32
+#include "pthread-win32.h"
+#else
+#include <pthread.h>
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#if (SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_SSL_ENGINE
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#endif
+
+static bool verify_peer_name_matches_certificate(PGconn *);
+static int verify_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static void destroy_ssl_system(void);
+static int initialize_SSL(PGconn *conn);
+static PostgresPollingStatusType open_client_SSL(PGconn *);
+static char *SSLerrmessage(void);
+static void SSLerrfree(char *buf);
+
+static int my_sock_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size);
+static int my_sock_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int size);
+static BIO_METHOD *my_BIO_s_socket(void);
+static int my_SSL_set_fd(PGconn *conn, int fd);
+
+
+static bool pq_init_ssl_lib = true;
+static bool pq_init_crypto_lib = true;
+
+/*
+ * SSL_context is currently shared between threads and therefore we need to be
+ * careful to lock around any usage of it when providing thread safety.
+ * ssl_config_mutex is the mutex that we use to protect it.
+ */
+static SSL_CTX *SSL_context = NULL;
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_THREAD_SAFETY
+static long ssl_open_connections = 0;
+
+#ifndef WIN32
+static pthread_mutex_t ssl_config_mutex = PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER;
+#else
+static pthread_mutex_t ssl_config_mutex = NULL;
+static long win32_ssl_create_mutex = 0;
+#endif
+#endif /* ENABLE_THREAD_SAFETY */
+
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Procedures common to all secure sessions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * Exported function to allow application to tell us it's already
+ * initialized OpenSSL and/or libcrypto.
+ */
+void
+pgtls_init_library(bool do_ssl, int do_crypto)
+{
+#ifdef ENABLE_THREAD_SAFETY
+
+ /*
+ * Disallow changing the flags while we have open connections, else we'd
+ * get completely confused.
+ */
+ if (ssl_open_connections != 0)
+ return;
+#endif
+
+ pq_init_ssl_lib = do_ssl;
+ pq_init_crypto_lib = do_crypto;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Begin or continue negotiating a secure session.
+ */
+PostgresPollingStatusType
+pgtls_open_client(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ /* First time through? */
+ if (conn->ssl == NULL)
+ {
+#ifdef ENABLE_THREAD_SAFETY
+ int rc;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_THREAD_SAFETY
+ if ((rc = pthread_mutex_lock(&ssl_config_mutex)))
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("could not acquire mutex: %s\n"), strerror(rc));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+#endif
+ /* Create a connection-specific SSL object */
+ if (!(conn->ssl = SSL_new(SSL_context)) ||
+ !SSL_set_app_data(conn->ssl, conn) ||
+ !my_SSL_set_fd(conn, conn->sock))
+ {
+ char *err = SSLerrmessage();
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("could not establish SSL connection: %s\n"),
+ err);
+ SSLerrfree(err);
+#ifdef ENABLE_THREAD_SAFETY
+ pthread_mutex_unlock(&ssl_config_mutex);
+#endif
+ pgtls_close(conn);
+
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ conn->ssl_in_use = true;
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_THREAD_SAFETY
+ pthread_mutex_unlock(&ssl_config_mutex);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Load client certificate, private key, and trusted CA certs.
+ */
+ if (initialize_SSL(conn) != 0)
+ {
+ /* initialize_SSL already put a message in conn->errorMessage */
+ pgtls_close(conn);
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Begin or continue the actual handshake */
+ return open_client_SSL(conn);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read data from a secure connection.
+ *
+ * On failure, this function is responsible for putting a suitable message
+ * into conn->errorMessage. The caller must still inspect errno, but only
+ * to determine whether to continue/retry after error.
+ */
+ssize_t
+pgtls_read(PGconn *conn, void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ ssize_t n;
+ int result_errno = 0;
+ char sebuf[256];
+ int err;
+
+rloop:
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(0);
+ n = SSL_read(conn->ssl, ptr, len);
+ err = SSL_get_error(conn->ssl, n);
+ switch (err)
+ {
+ case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
+ if (n < 0)
+ {
+ /* Not supposed to happen, so we don't translate the msg */
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ "SSL_read failed but did not provide error information\n");
+ /* assume the connection is broken */
+ result_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+ n = 0;
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+
+ /*
+ * Returning 0 here would cause caller to wait for read-ready,
+ * which is not correct since what SSL wants is wait for
+ * write-ready. The former could get us stuck in an infinite
+ * wait, so don't risk it; busy-loop instead.
+ */
+ goto rloop;
+ case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
+ if (n < 0)
+ {
+ result_errno = SOCK_ERRNO;
+ if (result_errno == EPIPE ||
+ result_errno == ECONNRESET)
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext(
+ "server closed the connection unexpectedly\n"
+ "\tThis probably means the server terminated abnormally\n"
+ "\tbefore or while processing the request.\n"));
+ else
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL SYSCALL error: %s\n"),
+ SOCK_STRERROR(result_errno,
+ sebuf, sizeof(sebuf)));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL SYSCALL error: EOF detected\n"));
+ /* assume the connection is broken */
+ result_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ n = -1;
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
+ {
+ char *errm = SSLerrmessage();
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL error: %s\n"), errm);
+ SSLerrfree(errm);
+ /* assume the connection is broken */
+ result_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ n = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+ case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
+
+ /*
+ * Per OpenSSL documentation, this error code is only returned
+ * for a clean connection closure, so we should not report it
+ * as a server crash.
+ */
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL connection has been closed unexpectedly\n"));
+ result_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ n = -1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unrecognized SSL error code: %d\n"),
+ err);
+ /* assume the connection is broken */
+ result_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ n = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* ensure we return the intended errno to caller */
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(result_errno);
+
+ return n;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write data to a secure connection.
+ *
+ * On failure, this function is responsible for putting a suitable message
+ * into conn->errorMessage. The caller must still inspect errno, but only
+ * to determine whether to continue/retry after error.
+ */
+ssize_t
+pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ ssize_t n;
+ int result_errno = 0;
+ char sebuf[256];
+ int err;
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(0);
+ n = SSL_write(conn->ssl, ptr, len);
+ err = SSL_get_error(conn->ssl, n);
+ switch (err)
+ {
+ case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
+ if (n < 0)
+ {
+ /* Not supposed to happen, so we don't translate the msg */
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ "SSL_write failed but did not provide error information\n");
+ /* assume the connection is broken */
+ result_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+
+ /*
+ * Returning 0 here causes caller to wait for write-ready,
+ * which is not really the right thing, but it's the best we
+ * can do.
+ */
+ n = 0;
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+ n = 0;
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
+ if (n < 0)
+ {
+ result_errno = SOCK_ERRNO;
+ if (result_errno == EPIPE || result_errno == ECONNRESET)
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext(
+ "server closed the connection unexpectedly\n"
+ "\tThis probably means the server terminated abnormally\n"
+ "\tbefore or while processing the request.\n"));
+ else
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL SYSCALL error: %s\n"),
+ SOCK_STRERROR(result_errno,
+ sebuf, sizeof(sebuf)));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL SYSCALL error: EOF detected\n"));
+ /* assume the connection is broken */
+ result_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ n = -1;
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
+ {
+ char *errm = SSLerrmessage();
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL error: %s\n"), errm);
+ SSLerrfree(errm);
+ /* assume the connection is broken */
+ result_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ n = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+ case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
+
+ /*
+ * Per OpenSSL documentation, this error code is only returned
+ * for a clean connection closure, so we should not report it
+ * as a server crash.
+ */
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL connection has been closed unexpectedly\n"));
+ result_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ n = -1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unrecognized SSL error code: %d\n"),
+ err);
+ /* assume the connection is broken */
+ result_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ n = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* ensure we return the intended errno to caller */
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(result_errno);
+
+ return n;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* OpenSSL specific code */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * Certificate verification callback
+ *
+ * This callback allows us to log intermediate problems during
+ * verification, but there doesn't seem to be a clean way to get
+ * our PGconn * structure. So we can't log anything!
+ *
+ * This callback also allows us to override the default acceptance
+ * criteria (e.g., accepting self-signed or expired certs), but
+ * for now we accept the default checks.
+ */
+static int
+verify_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ok;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Check if a wildcard certificate matches the server hostname.
+ *
+ * The rule for this is:
+ * 1. We only match the '*' character as wildcard
+ * 2. We match only wildcards at the start of the string
+ * 3. The '*' character does *not* match '.', meaning that we match only
+ * a single pathname component.
+ * 4. We don't support more than one '*' in a single pattern.
+ *
+ * This is roughly in line with RFC2818, but contrary to what most browsers
+ * appear to be implementing (point 3 being the difference)
+ *
+ * Matching is always case-insensitive, since DNS is case insensitive.
+ */
+static int
+wildcard_certificate_match(const char *pattern, const char *string)
+{
+ int lenpat = strlen(pattern);
+ int lenstr = strlen(string);
+
+ /* If we don't start with a wildcard, it's not a match (rule 1 & 2) */
+ if (lenpat < 3 ||
+ pattern[0] != '*' ||
+ pattern[1] != '.')
+ return 0;
+
+ if (lenpat > lenstr)
+ /* If pattern is longer than the string, we can never match */
+ return 0;
+
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(pattern + 1, string + lenstr - lenpat + 1) != 0)
+
+ /*
+ * If string does not end in pattern (minus the wildcard), we don't
+ * match
+ */
+ return 0;
+
+ if (strchr(string, '.') < string + lenstr - lenpat)
+
+ /*
+ * If there is a dot left of where the pattern started to match, we
+ * don't match (rule 3)
+ */
+ return 0;
+
+ /* String ended with pattern, and didn't have a dot before, so we match */
+ return 1;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Verify that common name resolves to peer.
+ */
+static bool
+verify_peer_name_matches_certificate(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ char *peer_cn;
+ int r;
+ int len;
+ bool result;
+
+ /*
+ * If told not to verify the peer name, don't do it. Return true
+ * indicating that the verification was successful.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "verify-full") != 0)
+ return true;
+
+ /*
+ * Extract the common name from the certificate.
+ *
+ * XXX: Should support alternate names here
+ */
+ /* First find out the name's length and allocate a buffer for it. */
+ len = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(conn->peer),
+ NID_commonName, NULL, 0);
+ if (len == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("could not get server common name from server certificate\n"));
+ return false;
+ }
+ peer_cn = malloc(len + 1);
+ if (peer_cn == NULL)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("out of memory\n"));
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ r = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(conn->peer),
+ NID_commonName, peer_cn, len + 1);
+ if (r != len)
+ {
+ /* Got different length than on the first call. Shouldn't happen. */
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("could not get server common name from server certificate\n"));
+ free(peer_cn);
+ return false;
+ }
+ peer_cn[len] = '\0';
+
+ /*
+ * Reject embedded NULLs in certificate common name to prevent attacks
+ * like CVE-2009-4034.
+ */
+ if (len != strlen(peer_cn))
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL certificate's common name contains embedded null\n"));
+ free(peer_cn);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We got the peer's common name. Now compare it against the originally
+ * given hostname.
+ */
+ if (!(conn->pghost && conn->pghost[0] != '\0'))
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("host name must be specified for a verified SSL connection\n"));
+ result = false;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(peer_cn, conn->pghost) == 0)
+ /* Exact name match */
+ result = true;
+ else if (wildcard_certificate_match(peer_cn, conn->pghost))
+ /* Matched wildcard certificate */
+ result = true;
+ else
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("server common name \"%s\" does not match host name \"%s\"\n"),
+ peer_cn, conn->pghost);
+ result = false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ free(peer_cn);
+ return result;
+}
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_THREAD_SAFETY
+/*
+ * Callback functions for OpenSSL internal locking
+ */
+
+static unsigned long
+pq_threadidcallback(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * This is not standards-compliant. pthread_self() returns pthread_t, and
+ * shouldn't be cast to unsigned long, but CRYPTO_set_id_callback requires
+ * it, so we have to do it.
+ */
+ return (unsigned long) pthread_self();
+}
+
+static pthread_mutex_t *pq_lockarray;
+
+static void
+pq_lockingcallback(int mode, int n, const char *file, int line)
+{
+ if (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK)
+ {
+ if (pthread_mutex_lock(&pq_lockarray[n]))
+ PGTHREAD_ERROR("failed to lock mutex");
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (pthread_mutex_unlock(&pq_lockarray[n]))
+ PGTHREAD_ERROR("failed to unlock mutex");
+ }
+}
+#endif /* ENABLE_THREAD_SAFETY */
+
+/*
+ * Initialize SSL system, in particular creating the SSL_context object
+ * that will be shared by all SSL-using connections in this process.
+ *
+ * In threadsafe mode, this includes setting up libcrypto callback functions
+ * to do thread locking.
+ *
+ * If the caller has told us (through PQinitOpenSSL) that he's taking care
+ * of libcrypto, we expect that callbacks are already set, and won't try to
+ * override it.
+ *
+ * The conn parameter is only used to be able to pass back an error
+ * message - no connection-local setup is made here.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if OK, -1 on failure (with a message in conn->errorMessage).
+ */
+int
+pgtls_init(PGconn *conn)
+{
+#ifdef ENABLE_THREAD_SAFETY
+#ifdef WIN32
+ /* Also see similar code in fe-connect.c, default_threadlock() */
+ if (ssl_config_mutex == NULL)
+ {
+ while (InterlockedExchange(&win32_ssl_create_mutex, 1) == 1)
+ /* loop, another thread own the lock */ ;
+ if (ssl_config_mutex == NULL)
+ {
+ if (pthread_mutex_init(&ssl_config_mutex, NULL))
+ return -1;
+ }
+ InterlockedExchange(&win32_ssl_create_mutex, 0);
+ }
+#endif
+ if (pthread_mutex_lock(&ssl_config_mutex))
+ return -1;
+
+ if (pq_init_crypto_lib)
+ {
+ /*
+ * If necessary, set up an array to hold locks for libcrypto.
+ * libcrypto will tell us how big to make this array.
+ */
+ if (pq_lockarray == NULL)
+ {
+ int i;
+
+ pq_lockarray = malloc(sizeof(pthread_mutex_t) * CRYPTO_num_locks());
+ if (!pq_lockarray)
+ {
+ pthread_mutex_unlock(&ssl_config_mutex);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < CRYPTO_num_locks(); i++)
+ {
+ if (pthread_mutex_init(&pq_lockarray[i], NULL))
+ {
+ free(pq_lockarray);
+ pq_lockarray = NULL;
+ pthread_mutex_unlock(&ssl_config_mutex);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_open_connections++ == 0)
+ {
+ /* These are only required for threaded libcrypto applications */
+ CRYPTO_set_id_callback(pq_threadidcallback);
+ CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(pq_lockingcallback);
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* ENABLE_THREAD_SAFETY */
+
+ if (!SSL_context)
+ {
+ if (pq_init_ssl_lib)
+ {
+#if SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
+ OPENSSL_config(NULL);
+#endif
+ SSL_library_init();
+ SSL_load_error_strings();
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We use SSLv23_method() because it can negotiate use of the highest
+ * mutually supported protocol version, while alternatives like
+ * TLSv1_2_method() permit only one specific version. Note that we
+ * don't actually allow SSL v2 or v3, only TLS protocols (see below).
+ */
+ SSL_context = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method());
+ if (!SSL_context)
+ {
+ char *err = SSLerrmessage();
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("could not create SSL context: %s\n"),
+ err);
+ SSLerrfree(err);
+#ifdef ENABLE_THREAD_SAFETY
+ pthread_mutex_unlock(&ssl_config_mutex);
+#endif
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Disable old protocol versions */
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(SSL_context, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3);
+
+ /*
+ * Disable OpenSSL's moving-write-buffer sanity check, because it
+ * causes unnecessary failures in nonblocking send cases.
+ */
+ SSL_CTX_set_mode(SSL_context, SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER);
+ }
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_THREAD_SAFETY
+ pthread_mutex_unlock(&ssl_config_mutex);
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function is needed because if the libpq library is unloaded
+ * from the application, the callback functions will no longer exist when
+ * libcrypto is used by other parts of the system. For this reason,
+ * we unregister the callback functions when the last libpq
+ * connection is closed. (The same would apply for OpenSSL callbacks
+ * if we had any.)
+ *
+ * Callbacks are only set when we're compiled in threadsafe mode, so
+ * we only need to remove them in this case.
+ */
+static void
+destroy_ssl_system(void)
+{
+#ifdef ENABLE_THREAD_SAFETY
+ /* Mutex is created in initialize_ssl_system() */
+ if (pthread_mutex_lock(&ssl_config_mutex))
+ return;
+
+ if (pq_init_crypto_lib && ssl_open_connections > 0)
+ --ssl_open_connections;
+
+ if (pq_init_crypto_lib && ssl_open_connections == 0)
+ {
+ /* No connections left, unregister libcrypto callbacks */
+ CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(NULL);
+ CRYPTO_set_id_callback(NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * We don't free the lock array or the SSL_context. If we get another
+ * connection in this process, we will just re-use them with the
+ * existing mutexes.
+ *
+ * This means we leak a little memory on repeated load/unload of the
+ * library.
+ */
+ }
+
+ pthread_mutex_unlock(&ssl_config_mutex);
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize (potentially) per-connection SSL data, namely the
+ * client certificate, private key, and trusted CA certs.
+ *
+ * conn->ssl must already be created. It receives the connection's client
+ * certificate and private key. Note however that certificates also get
+ * loaded into the SSL_context object, and are therefore accessible to all
+ * connections in this process. This should be OK as long as there aren't
+ * any hash collisions among the certs.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if OK, -1 on failure (with a message in conn->errorMessage).
+ */
+static int
+initialize_SSL(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ struct stat buf;
+ char homedir[MAXPGPATH];
+ char fnbuf[MAXPGPATH];
+ char sebuf[256];
+ bool have_homedir;
+ bool have_cert;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * We'll need the home directory if any of the relevant parameters are
+ * defaulted. If pqGetHomeDirectory fails, act as though none of the
+ * files could be found.
+ */
+ if (!(conn->sslcert && strlen(conn->sslcert) > 0) ||
+ !(conn->sslkey && strlen(conn->sslkey) > 0) ||
+ !(conn->sslrootcert && strlen(conn->sslrootcert) > 0) ||
+ !(conn->sslcrl && strlen(conn->sslcrl) > 0))
+ have_homedir = pqGetHomeDirectory(homedir, sizeof(homedir));
+ else /* won't need it */
+ have_homedir = false;
+
+ /* Read the client certificate file */
+ if (conn->sslcert && strlen(conn->sslcert) > 0)
+ strncpy(fnbuf, conn->sslcert, sizeof(fnbuf));
+ else if (have_homedir)
+ snprintf(fnbuf, sizeof(fnbuf), "%s/%s", homedir, USER_CERT_FILE);
+ else
+ fnbuf[0] = '\0';
+
+ if (fnbuf[0] == '\0')
+ {
+ /* no home directory, proceed without a client cert */
+ have_cert = false;
+ }
+ else if (stat(fnbuf, &buf) != 0)
+ {
+ /*
+ * If file is not present, just go on without a client cert; server
+ * might or might not accept the connection. Any other error,
+ * however, is grounds for complaint.
+ */
+ if (errno != ENOENT && errno != ENOTDIR)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("could not open certificate file \"%s\": %s\n"),
+ fnbuf, pqStrerror(errno, sebuf, sizeof(sebuf)));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ have_cert = false;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * Cert file exists, so load it. Since OpenSSL doesn't provide the
+ * equivalent of "SSL_use_certificate_chain_file", we actually have to
+ * load the file twice. The first call loads any extra certs after
+ * the first one into chain-cert storage associated with the
+ * SSL_context. The second call loads the first cert (only) into the
+ * SSL object, where it will be correctly paired with the private key
+ * we load below. We do it this way so that each connection
+ * understands which subject cert to present, in case different
+ * sslcert settings are used for different connections in the same
+ * process.
+ *
+ * NOTE: This function may also modify our SSL_context and therefore
+ * we have to lock around this call and any places where we use the
+ * SSL_context struct.
+ */
+#ifdef ENABLE_THREAD_SAFETY
+ int rc;
+
+ if ((rc = pthread_mutex_lock(&ssl_config_mutex)))
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("could not acquire mutex: %s\n"), strerror(rc));
+ return -1;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL_context, fnbuf) != 1)
+ {
+ char *err = SSLerrmessage();
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("could not read certificate file \"%s\": %s\n"),
+ fnbuf, err);
+ SSLerrfree(err);
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_THREAD_SAFETY
+ pthread_mutex_unlock(&ssl_config_mutex);
+#endif
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_use_certificate_file(conn->ssl, fnbuf, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) != 1)
+ {
+ char *err = SSLerrmessage();
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("could not read certificate file \"%s\": %s\n"),
+ fnbuf, err);
+ SSLerrfree(err);
+#ifdef ENABLE_THREAD_SAFETY
+ pthread_mutex_unlock(&ssl_config_mutex);
+#endif
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* need to load the associated private key, too */
+ have_cert = true;
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_THREAD_SAFETY
+ pthread_mutex_unlock(&ssl_config_mutex);
+#endif
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Read the SSL key. If a key is specified, treat it as an engine:key
+ * combination if there is colon present - we don't support files with
+ * colon in the name. The exception is if the second character is a colon,
+ * in which case it can be a Windows filename with drive specification.
+ */
+ if (have_cert && conn->sslkey && strlen(conn->sslkey) > 0)
+ {
+#ifdef USE_SSL_ENGINE
+ if (strchr(conn->sslkey, ':')
+#ifdef WIN32
+ && conn->sslkey[1] != ':'
+#endif
+ )
+ {
+ /* Colon, but not in second character, treat as engine:key */
+ char *engine_str = strdup(conn->sslkey);
+ char *engine_colon;
+
+ if (engine_str == NULL)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("out of memory\n"));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* cannot return NULL because we already checked before strdup */
+ engine_colon = strchr(engine_str, ':');
+
+ *engine_colon = '\0'; /* engine_str now has engine name */
+ engine_colon++; /* engine_colon now has key name */
+
+ conn->engine = ENGINE_by_id(engine_str);
+ if (conn->engine == NULL)
+ {
+ char *err = SSLerrmessage();
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("could not load SSL engine \"%s\": %s\n"),
+ engine_str, err);
+ SSLerrfree(err);
+ free(engine_str);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (ENGINE_init(conn->engine) == 0)
+ {
+ char *err = SSLerrmessage();
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("could not initialize SSL engine \"%s\": %s\n"),
+ engine_str, err);
+ SSLerrfree(err);
+ ENGINE_free(conn->engine);
+ conn->engine = NULL;
+ free(engine_str);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ pkey = ENGINE_load_private_key(conn->engine, engine_colon,
+ NULL, NULL);
+ if (pkey == NULL)
+ {
+ char *err = SSLerrmessage();
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("could not read private SSL key \"%s\" from engine \"%s\": %s\n"),
+ engine_colon, engine_str, err);
+ SSLerrfree(err);
+ ENGINE_finish(conn->engine);
+ ENGINE_free(conn->engine);
+ conn->engine = NULL;
+ free(engine_str);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (SSL_use_PrivateKey(conn->ssl, pkey) != 1)
+ {
+ char *err = SSLerrmessage();
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("could not load private SSL key \"%s\" from engine \"%s\": %s\n"),
+ engine_colon, engine_str, err);
+ SSLerrfree(err);
+ ENGINE_finish(conn->engine);
+ ENGINE_free(conn->engine);
+ conn->engine = NULL;
+ free(engine_str);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ free(engine_str);
+
+ fnbuf[0] = '\0'; /* indicate we're not going to load from a
+ * file */
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* USE_SSL_ENGINE */
+ {
+ /* PGSSLKEY is not an engine, treat it as a filename */
+ strncpy(fnbuf, conn->sslkey, sizeof(fnbuf));
+ }
+ }
+ else if (have_homedir)
+ {
+ /* No PGSSLKEY specified, load default file */
+ snprintf(fnbuf, sizeof(fnbuf), "%s/%s", homedir, USER_KEY_FILE);
+ }
+ else
+ fnbuf[0] = '\0';
+
+ if (have_cert && fnbuf[0] != '\0')
+ {
+ /* read the client key from file */
+
+ if (stat(fnbuf, &buf) != 0)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("certificate present, but not private key file \"%s\"\n"),
+ fnbuf);
+ return -1;
+ }
+#ifndef WIN32
+ if (!S_ISREG(buf.st_mode) || buf.st_mode & (S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO))
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("private key file \"%s\" has group or world access; permissions should be u=rw (0600) or less\n"),
+ fnbuf);
+ return -1;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (SSL_use_PrivateKey_file(conn->ssl, fnbuf, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) != 1)
+ {
+ char *err = SSLerrmessage();
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("could not load private key file \"%s\": %s\n"),
+ fnbuf, err);
+ SSLerrfree(err);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* verify that the cert and key go together */
+ if (have_cert &&
+ SSL_check_private_key(conn->ssl) != 1)
+ {
+ char *err = SSLerrmessage();
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("certificate does not match private key file \"%s\": %s\n"),
+ fnbuf, err);
+ SSLerrfree(err);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the root cert file exists, load it so we can perform certificate
+ * verification. If sslmode is "verify-full" we will also do further
+ * verification after the connection has been completed.
+ */
+ if (conn->sslrootcert && strlen(conn->sslrootcert) > 0)
+ strncpy(fnbuf, conn->sslrootcert, sizeof(fnbuf));
+ else if (have_homedir)
+ snprintf(fnbuf, sizeof(fnbuf), "%s/%s", homedir, ROOT_CERT_FILE);
+ else
+ fnbuf[0] = '\0';
+
+ if (fnbuf[0] != '\0' &&
+ stat(fnbuf, &buf) == 0)
+ {
+ X509_STORE *cvstore;
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_THREAD_SAFETY
+ int rc;
+
+ if ((rc = pthread_mutex_lock(&ssl_config_mutex)))
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("could not acquire mutex: %s\n"), strerror(rc));
+ return -1;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_context, fnbuf, NULL) != 1)
+ {
+ char *err = SSLerrmessage();
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("could not read root certificate file \"%s\": %s\n"),
+ fnbuf, err);
+ SSLerrfree(err);
+#ifdef ENABLE_THREAD_SAFETY
+ pthread_mutex_unlock(&ssl_config_mutex);
+#endif
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if ((cvstore = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(SSL_context)) != NULL)
+ {
+ if (conn->sslcrl && strlen(conn->sslcrl) > 0)
+ strncpy(fnbuf, conn->sslcrl, sizeof(fnbuf));
+ else if (have_homedir)
+ snprintf(fnbuf, sizeof(fnbuf), "%s/%s", homedir, ROOT_CRL_FILE);
+ else
+ fnbuf[0] = '\0';
+
+ /* Set the flags to check against the complete CRL chain */
+ if (fnbuf[0] != '\0' &&
+ X509_STORE_load_locations(cvstore, fnbuf, NULL) == 1)
+ {
+ /* OpenSSL 0.96 does not support X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK */
+#ifdef X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK
+ X509_STORE_set_flags(cvstore,
+ X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK | X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL);
+#else
+ char *err = SSLerrmessage();
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL library does not support CRL certificates (file \"%s\")\n"),
+ fnbuf);
+ SSLerrfree(err);
+#ifdef ENABLE_THREAD_SAFETY
+ pthread_mutex_unlock(&ssl_config_mutex);
+#endif
+ return -1;
+#endif
+ }
+ /* if not found, silently ignore; we do not require CRL */
+ }
+#ifdef ENABLE_THREAD_SAFETY
+ pthread_mutex_unlock(&ssl_config_mutex);
+#endif
+
+ SSL_set_verify(conn->ssl, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, verify_cb);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * stat() failed; assume root file doesn't exist. If sslmode is
+ * verify-ca or verify-full, this is an error. Otherwise, continue
+ * without performing any server cert verification.
+ */
+ if (conn->sslmode[0] == 'v') /* "verify-ca" or "verify-full" */
+ {
+ /*
+ * The only way to reach here with an empty filename is if
+ * pqGetHomeDirectory failed. That's a sufficiently unusual case
+ * that it seems worth having a specialized error message for it.
+ */
+ if (fnbuf[0] == '\0')
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("could not get home directory to locate root certificate file\n"
+ "Either provide the file or change sslmode to disable server certificate verification.\n"));
+ else
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("root certificate file \"%s\" does not exist\n"
+ "Either provide the file or change sslmode to disable server certificate verification.\n"), fnbuf);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the OpenSSL version used supports it (from 1.0.0 on) and the user
+ * requested it, disable SSL compression.
+ */
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
+ if (conn->sslcompression && conn->sslcompression[0] == '0')
+ {
+ SSL_set_options(conn->ssl, SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Attempt to negotiate SSL connection.
+ */
+static PostgresPollingStatusType
+open_client_SSL(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ r = SSL_connect(conn->ssl);
+ if (r <= 0)
+ {
+ int err = SSL_get_error(conn->ssl, r);
+
+ switch (err)
+ {
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+ return PGRES_POLLING_READING;
+
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+ return PGRES_POLLING_WRITING;
+
+ case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
+ {
+ char sebuf[256];
+
+ if (r == -1)
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL SYSCALL error: %s\n"),
+ SOCK_STRERROR(SOCK_ERRNO, sebuf, sizeof(sebuf)));
+ else
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL SYSCALL error: EOF detected\n"));
+ pgtls_close(conn);
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
+ {
+ char *err = SSLerrmessage();
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL error: %s\n"),
+ err);
+ SSLerrfree(err);
+ pgtls_close(conn);
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unrecognized SSL error code: %d\n"),
+ err);
+ pgtls_close(conn);
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We already checked the server certificate in initialize_SSL() using
+ * SSL_CTX_set_verify(), if root.crt exists.
+ */
+
+ /* get server certificate */
+ conn->peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(conn->ssl);
+ if (conn->peer == NULL)
+ {
+ char *err = SSLerrmessage();
+
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("certificate could not be obtained: %s\n"),
+ err);
+ SSLerrfree(err);
+ pgtls_close(conn);
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ if (!verify_peer_name_matches_certificate(conn))
+ {
+ pgtls_close(conn);
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL handshake is complete */
+ return PGRES_POLLING_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Close SSL connection.
+ */
+void
+pgtls_close(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ bool destroy_needed = false;
+
+ if (conn->ssl)
+ {
+ /*
+ * We can't destroy everything SSL-related here due to the possible
+ * later calls to OpenSSL routines which may need our thread
+ * callbacks, so set a flag here and check at the end.
+ */
+ destroy_needed = true;
+
+ SSL_shutdown(conn->ssl);
+ SSL_free(conn->ssl);
+ conn->ssl = NULL;
+ conn->ssl_in_use = false;
+ }
+
+ if (conn->peer)
+ {
+ X509_free(conn->peer);
+ conn->peer = NULL;
+ }
+
+#ifdef USE_SSL_ENGINE
+ if (conn->engine)
+ {
+ ENGINE_finish(conn->engine);
+ ENGINE_free(conn->engine);
+ conn->engine = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * This will remove our SSL locking hooks, if this is the last SSL
+ * connection, which means we must wait to call it until after all SSL
+ * calls have been made, otherwise we can end up with a race condition and
+ * possible deadlocks.
+ *
+ * See comments above destroy_ssl_system().
+ */
+ if (destroy_needed)
+ destroy_ssl_system();
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Obtain reason string for last SSL error
+ *
+ * Some caution is needed here since ERR_reason_error_string will
+ * return NULL if it doesn't recognize the error code. We don't
+ * want to return NULL ever.
+ */
+static char ssl_nomem[] = "out of memory allocating error description";
+
+#define SSL_ERR_LEN 128
+
+static char *
+SSLerrmessage(void)
+{
+ unsigned long errcode;
+ const char *errreason;
+ char *errbuf;
+
+ errbuf = malloc(SSL_ERR_LEN);
+ if (!errbuf)
+ return ssl_nomem;
+ errcode = ERR_get_error();
+ if (errcode == 0)
+ {
+ snprintf(errbuf, SSL_ERR_LEN, libpq_gettext("no SSL error reported"));
+ return errbuf;
+ }
+ errreason = ERR_reason_error_string(errcode);
+ if (errreason != NULL)
+ {
+ strlcpy(errbuf, errreason, SSL_ERR_LEN);
+ return errbuf;
+ }
+ snprintf(errbuf, SSL_ERR_LEN, libpq_gettext("SSL error code %lu"), errcode);
+ return errbuf;
+}
+
+static void
+SSLerrfree(char *buf)
+{
+ if (buf != ssl_nomem)
+ free(buf);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return pointer to OpenSSL object.
+ */
+void *
+PQgetssl(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ if (!conn)
+ return NULL;
+ return conn->ssl;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Private substitute BIO: this does the sending and receiving using send() and
+ * recv() instead. This is so that we can enable and disable interrupts
+ * just while calling recv(). We cannot have interrupts occurring while
+ * the bulk of openssl runs, because it uses malloc() and possibly other
+ * non-reentrant libc facilities. We also need to call send() and recv()
+ * directly so it gets passed through the socket/signals layer on Win32.
+ *
+ * These functions are closely modelled on the standard socket BIO in OpenSSL;
+ * see sock_read() and sock_write() in OpenSSL's crypto/bio/bss_sock.c.
+ * XXX OpenSSL 1.0.1e considers many more errcodes than just EINTR as reasons
+ * to retry; do we need to adopt their logic for that?
+ */
+
+static bool my_bio_initialized = false;
+static BIO_METHOD my_bio_methods;
+
+static int
+my_sock_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size)
+{
+ int res;
+ int save_errno;
+
+ res = pqsecure_raw_read((PGconn *) h->ptr, buf, size);
+ save_errno = errno;
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(h);
+ if (res < 0)
+ {
+ switch (save_errno)
+ {
+#ifdef EAGAIN
+ case EAGAIN:
+#endif
+#if defined(EWOULDBLOCK) && (!defined(EAGAIN) || (EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN))
+ case EWOULDBLOCK:
+#endif
+ case EINTR:
+ BIO_set_retry_read(h);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ errno = save_errno;
+ return res;
+}
+
+static int
+my_sock_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int size)
+{
+ int res;
+ int save_errno;
+
+ res = pqsecure_raw_write((PGconn *) h->ptr, buf, size);
+ save_errno = errno;
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(h);
+ if (res <= 0)
+ {
+ if (save_errno == EINTR)
+ {
+ BIO_set_retry_write(h);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return res;
+}
+
+static BIO_METHOD *
+my_BIO_s_socket(void)
+{
+ if (!my_bio_initialized)
+ {
+ memcpy(&my_bio_methods, BIO_s_socket(), sizeof(BIO_METHOD));
+ my_bio_methods.bread = my_sock_read;
+ my_bio_methods.bwrite = my_sock_write;
+ my_bio_initialized = true;
+ }
+ return &my_bio_methods;
+}
+
+/* This should exactly match openssl's SSL_set_fd except for using my BIO */
+static int
+my_SSL_set_fd(PGconn *conn, int fd)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ BIO *bio = NULL;
+
+ bio = BIO_new(my_BIO_s_socket());
+ if (bio == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Use 'ptr' to store pointer to PGconn */
+ bio->ptr = conn;
+
+ SSL_set_bio(conn->ssl, bio, bio);
+ BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ ret = 1;
+err:
+ return ret;
+}