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-rw-r--r--src/common/scram-common.c196
1 files changed, 196 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/common/scram-common.c b/src/common/scram-common.c
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+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * scram-common.c
+ * Shared frontend/backend code for SCRAM authentication
+ *
+ * This contains the common low-level functions needed in both frontend and
+ * backend, for implement the Salted Challenge Response Authentication
+ * Mechanism (SCRAM), per IETF's RFC 5802.
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 2016, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/common/scram-common.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+#include "postgres.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+#else
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "common/scram-common.h"
+
+#define HMAC_IPAD 0x36
+#define HMAC_OPAD 0x5C
+
+/*
+ * Calculate HMAC per RFC2104.
+ *
+ * The hash function used is SHA-256.
+ */
+void
+scram_HMAC_init(scram_HMAC_ctx *ctx, const uint8 *key, int keylen)
+{
+ uint8 k_ipad[SHA256_HMAC_B];
+ int i;
+ uint8 keybuf[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
+
+ /*
+ * If the key is longer than the block size (64 bytes for SHA-256), pass
+ * it through SHA-256 once to shrink it down.
+ */
+ if (keylen > SHA256_HMAC_B)
+ {
+ pg_sha256_ctx sha256_ctx;
+
+ pg_sha256_init(&sha256_ctx);
+ pg_sha256_update(&sha256_ctx, key, keylen);
+ pg_sha256_final(&sha256_ctx, keybuf);
+ key = keybuf;
+ keylen = SCRAM_KEY_LEN;
+ }
+
+ memset(k_ipad, HMAC_IPAD, SHA256_HMAC_B);
+ memset(ctx->k_opad, HMAC_OPAD, SHA256_HMAC_B);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < keylen; i++)
+ {
+ k_ipad[i] ^= key[i];
+ ctx->k_opad[i] ^= key[i];
+ }
+
+ /* tmp = H(K XOR ipad, text) */
+ pg_sha256_init(&ctx->sha256ctx);
+ pg_sha256_update(&ctx->sha256ctx, k_ipad, SHA256_HMAC_B);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Update HMAC calculation
+ * The hash function used is SHA-256.
+ */
+void
+scram_HMAC_update(scram_HMAC_ctx *ctx, const char *str, int slen)
+{
+ pg_sha256_update(&ctx->sha256ctx, (const uint8 *) str, slen);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Finalize HMAC calculation.
+ * The hash function used is SHA-256.
+ */
+void
+scram_HMAC_final(uint8 *result, scram_HMAC_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ uint8 h[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
+
+ pg_sha256_final(&ctx->sha256ctx, h);
+
+ /* H(K XOR opad, tmp) */
+ pg_sha256_init(&ctx->sha256ctx);
+ pg_sha256_update(&ctx->sha256ctx, ctx->k_opad, SHA256_HMAC_B);
+ pg_sha256_update(&ctx->sha256ctx, h, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
+ pg_sha256_final(&ctx->sha256ctx, result);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Iterate hash calculation of HMAC entry using given salt.
+ * scram_Hi() is essentially PBKDF2 (see RFC2898) with HMAC() as the
+ * pseudorandom function.
+ */
+static void
+scram_Hi(const char *str, const char *salt, int saltlen, int iterations, uint8 *result)
+{
+ int str_len = strlen(str);
+ uint32 one = htonl(1);
+ int i,
+ j;
+ uint8 Ui[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
+ uint8 Ui_prev[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
+ scram_HMAC_ctx hmac_ctx;
+
+ /* First iteration */
+ scram_HMAC_init(&hmac_ctx, (uint8 *) str, str_len);
+ scram_HMAC_update(&hmac_ctx, salt, saltlen);
+ scram_HMAC_update(&hmac_ctx, (char *) &one, sizeof(uint32));
+ scram_HMAC_final(Ui_prev, &hmac_ctx);
+ memcpy(result, Ui_prev, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
+
+ /* Subsequent iterations */
+ for (i = 2; i <= iterations; i++)
+ {
+ scram_HMAC_init(&hmac_ctx, (uint8 *) str, str_len);
+ scram_HMAC_update(&hmac_ctx, (const char *) Ui_prev, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
+ scram_HMAC_final(Ui, &hmac_ctx);
+ for (j = 0; j < SCRAM_KEY_LEN; j++)
+ result[j] ^= Ui[j];
+ memcpy(Ui_prev, Ui, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
+ }
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Calculate SHA-256 hash for a NULL-terminated string. (The NULL terminator is
+ * not included in the hash).
+ */
+void
+scram_H(const uint8 *input, int len, uint8 *result)
+{
+ pg_sha256_ctx ctx;
+
+ pg_sha256_init(&ctx);
+ pg_sha256_update(&ctx, input, len);
+ pg_sha256_final(&ctx, result);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Normalize a password for SCRAM authentication.
+ */
+static void
+scram_Normalize(const char *password, char *result)
+{
+ /*
+ * XXX: Here SASLprep should be applied on password. However, per RFC5802,
+ * it is required that the password is encoded in UTF-8, something that is
+ * not guaranteed in this protocol. We may want to revisit this
+ * normalization function once encoding functions are available as well in
+ * the frontend in order to be able to encode properly this string, and
+ * then apply SASLprep on it.
+ */
+ memcpy(result, password, strlen(password) + 1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Encrypt password for SCRAM authentication. This basically applies the
+ * normalization of the password and a hash calculation using the salt
+ * value given by caller.
+ */
+static void
+scram_SaltedPassword(const char *password, const char *salt, int saltlen, int iterations,
+ uint8 *result)
+{
+ char *pwbuf;
+
+ pwbuf = (char *) malloc(strlen(password) + 1);
+ scram_Normalize(password, pwbuf);
+ scram_Hi(pwbuf, salt, saltlen, iterations, result);
+ free(pwbuf);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate ClientKey or ServerKey.
+ */
+void
+scram_ClientOrServerKey(const char *password,
+ const char *salt, int saltlen, int iterations,
+ const char *keystr, uint8 *result)
+{
+ uint8 keybuf[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
+ scram_HMAC_ctx ctx;
+
+ scram_SaltedPassword(password, salt, saltlen, iterations, keybuf);
+ scram_HMAC_init(&ctx, keybuf, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
+ scram_HMAC_update(&ctx, keystr, strlen(keystr));
+ scram_HMAC_final(result, &ctx);
+}