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-rw-r--r--src/backend/utils/adt/acl.c21
1 files changed, 11 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/src/backend/utils/adt/acl.c b/src/backend/utils/adt/acl.c
index dfac1243a40..38cd5b89c99 100644
--- a/src/backend/utils/adt/acl.c
+++ b/src/backend/utils/adt/acl.c
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ static Oid get_role_oid_or_public(const char *rolname);
/*
* getid
* Consumes the first alphanumeric string (identifier) found in string
- * 's', ignoring any leading white space. If it finds a double quote
+ * 's', ignoring any leading white space. If it finds a double quote
* it returns the word inside the quotes.
*
* RETURNS:
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ putid(char *p, const char *s)
*
* RETURNS:
* the string position in 's' immediately following the ACL
- * specification. Also:
+ * specification. Also:
* - loads the structure pointed to by 'aip' with the appropriate
* UID/GID, id type identifier and mode type values.
*/
@@ -837,7 +837,7 @@ acldefault(GrantObjectType objtype, Oid ownerId)
/*
- * SQL-accessible version of acldefault(). Hackish mapping from "char" type to
+ * SQL-accessible version of acldefault(). Hackish mapping from "char" type to
* ACL_OBJECT_* values, but it's only used in the information schema, not
* documented for general use.
*/
@@ -1006,7 +1006,7 @@ aclupdate(const Acl *old_acl, const AclItem *mod_aip,
}
/*
- * Remove abandoned privileges (cascading revoke). Currently we can only
+ * Remove abandoned privileges (cascading revoke). Currently we can only
* handle this when the grantee is not PUBLIC.
*/
if ((old_goptions & ~new_goptions) != 0)
@@ -1072,7 +1072,7 @@ aclnewowner(const Acl *old_acl, Oid oldOwnerId, Oid newOwnerId)
/*
* If the old ACL contained any references to the new owner, then we may
- * now have generated an ACL containing duplicate entries. Find them and
+ * now have generated an ACL containing duplicate entries. Find them and
* merge them so that there are not duplicates. (This is relatively
* expensive since we use a stupid O(N^2) algorithm, but it's unlikely to
* be the normal case.)
@@ -1083,7 +1083,7 @@ aclnewowner(const Acl *old_acl, Oid oldOwnerId, Oid newOwnerId)
* remove privilege-free entries, should there be any in the input.) dst
* is the next output slot, targ is the currently considered input slot
* (always >= dst), and src scans entries to the right of targ looking for
- * duplicates. Once an entry has been emitted to dst it is known
+ * duplicates. Once an entry has been emitted to dst it is known
* duplicate-free and need not be considered anymore.
*/
if (newpresent)
@@ -2468,7 +2468,7 @@ column_privilege_check(Oid tableoid, AttrNumber attnum,
* existence of the pg_class row before risking calling pg_class_aclcheck.
* Note: it might seem there's a race condition against concurrent DROP,
* but really it's safe because there will be no syscache flush between
- * here and there. So if we see the row in the syscache, so will
+ * here and there. So if we see the row in the syscache, so will
* pg_class_aclcheck.
*/
if (!SearchSysCacheExists1(RELOID, ObjectIdGetDatum(tableoid)))
@@ -4904,7 +4904,7 @@ is_member_of_role_nosuper(Oid member, Oid role)
/*
- * Is member an admin of role? That is, is member the role itself (subject to
+ * Is member an admin of role? That is, is member the role itself (subject to
* restrictions below), a member (directly or indirectly) WITH ADMIN OPTION,
* or a superuser?
*/
@@ -4919,6 +4919,7 @@ is_admin_of_role(Oid member, Oid role)
return true;
if (member == role)
+
/*
* A role can admin itself when it matches the session user and we're
* outside any security-restricted operation, SECURITY DEFINER or
@@ -5015,14 +5016,14 @@ count_one_bits(AclMode mask)
* The grantor must always be either the object owner or some role that has
* been explicitly granted grant options. This ensures that all granted
* privileges appear to flow from the object owner, and there are never
- * multiple "original sources" of a privilege. Therefore, if the would-be
+ * multiple "original sources" of a privilege. Therefore, if the would-be
* grantor is a member of a role that has the needed grant options, we have
* to do the grant as that role instead.
*
* It is possible that the would-be grantor is a member of several roles
* that have different subsets of the desired grant options, but no one
* role has 'em all. In this case we pick a role with the largest number
- * of desired options. Ties are broken in favor of closer ancestors.
+ * of desired options. Ties are broken in favor of closer ancestors.
*
* roleId: the role attempting to do the GRANT/REVOKE
* privileges: the privileges to be granted/revoked