libpq: Add support for require_auth to control authorized auth methods

The new connection parameter require_auth allows a libpq client to
define a list of comma-separated acceptable authentication types for use
with the server.  There is no negotiation: if the server does not
present one of the allowed authentication requests, the connection
attempt done by the client fails.

The following keywords can be defined in the list:
- password, for AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD.
- md5, for AUTH_REQ_MD5.
- gss, for AUTH_REQ_GSS[_CONT].
- sspi, for AUTH_REQ_SSPI and AUTH_REQ_GSS_CONT.
- scram-sha-256, for AUTH_REQ_SASL[_CONT|_FIN].
- creds, for AUTH_REQ_SCM_CREDS (perhaps this should be removed entirely
now).
- none, to control unauthenticated connections.

All the methods that can be defined in the list can be negated, like
"!password", in which case the server must NOT use the listed
authentication type.  The special method "none" allows/disallows the use
of unauthenticated connections (but it does not govern transport-level
authentication via TLS or GSSAPI).

Internally, the patch logic is tied to check_expected_areq(), that was
used for channel_binding, ensuring that an incoming request is
compatible with conn->require_auth.  It also introduces a new flag,
conn->client_finished_auth, which is set by various authentication
routines when the client side of the handshake is finished.  This
signals to check_expected_areq() that an AUTH_REQ_OK from the server is
expected, and allows the client to complain if the server bypasses
authentication entirely, with for example the reception of a too-early
AUTH_REQ_OK message.

Regression tests are added in authentication TAP tests for all the
keywords supported (except "creds", because it is around only for
compatibility reasons).  A new TAP script has been added for SSPI, as
there was no script dedicated to it yet.  It relies on SSPI being the
default authentication method on Windows, as set by pg_regress.

Author: Jacob Champion
Reviewed-by: Peter Eisentraut, David G. Johnston, Michael Paquier
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/9e5a8ccddb8355ea9fa4b75a1e3a9edc88a70cd3.camel@vmware.com

1 files changed, 139 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth.c
index ab454e6cd02..a3b80dc550f 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth.c
@@ -136,7 +136,10 @@ pg_GSS_continue(PGconn *conn, int payloadlen)
 	}
 
 	if (maj_stat == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+	{
+		conn->client_finished_auth = true;
 		gss_release_name(&lmin_s, &conn->gtarg_nam);
+	}
 
 	return STATUS_OK;
 }
@@ -321,6 +324,9 @@ pg_SSPI_continue(PGconn *conn, int payloadlen)
 		FreeContextBuffer(outbuf.pBuffers[0].pvBuffer);
 	}
 
+	if (r == SEC_E_OK)
+		conn->client_finished_auth = true;
+
 	/* Cleanup is handled by the code in freePGconn() */
 	return STATUS_OK;
 }
@@ -735,6 +741,8 @@ pg_local_sendauth(PGconn *conn)
 						  strerror_r(errno, sebuf, sizeof(sebuf)));
 		return STATUS_ERROR;
 	}
+
+	conn->client_finished_auth = true;
 	return STATUS_OK;
 #else
 	libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "SCM_CRED authentication method not supported");
@@ -806,6 +814,41 @@ pg_password_sendauth(PGconn *conn, const char *password, AuthRequest areq)
 }
 
 /*
+ * Translate a disallowed AuthRequest code into an error message.
+ */
+static const char *
+auth_method_description(AuthRequest areq)
+{
+	switch (areq)
+	{
+		case AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD:
+			return libpq_gettext("server requested a cleartext password");
+		case AUTH_REQ_MD5:
+			return libpq_gettext("server requested a hashed password");
+		case AUTH_REQ_GSS:
+		case AUTH_REQ_GSS_CONT:
+			return libpq_gettext("server requested GSSAPI authentication");
+		case AUTH_REQ_SSPI:
+			return libpq_gettext("server requested SSPI authentication");
+		case AUTH_REQ_SCM_CREDS:
+			return libpq_gettext("server requested UNIX socket credentials");
+		case AUTH_REQ_SASL:
+		case AUTH_REQ_SASL_CONT:
+		case AUTH_REQ_SASL_FIN:
+			return libpq_gettext("server requested SASL authentication");
+	}
+
+	return libpq_gettext("server requested an unknown authentication type");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convenience macro for checking the allowed_auth_methods bitmask.  Caller
+ * must ensure that type is not greater than 31 (high bit of the bitmask).
+ */
+#define auth_method_allowed(conn, type) \
+	(((conn)->allowed_auth_methods & (1 << (type))) != 0)
+
+/*
  * Verify that the authentication request is expected, given the connection
  * parameters. This is especially important when the client wishes to
  * authenticate the server before any sensitive information is exchanged.
@@ -814,6 +857,99 @@ static bool
 check_expected_areq(AuthRequest areq, PGconn *conn)
 {
 	bool		result = true;
+	const char *reason = NULL;
+
+	StaticAssertDecl((sizeof(conn->allowed_auth_methods) * CHAR_BIT) > AUTH_REQ_MAX,
+					 "AUTH_REQ_MAX overflows the allowed_auth_methods bitmask");
+
+	/*
+	 * If the user required a specific auth method, or specified an allowed
+	 * set, then reject all others here, and make sure the server actually
+	 * completes an authentication exchange.
+	 */
+	if (conn->require_auth)
+	{
+		switch (areq)
+		{
+			case AUTH_REQ_OK:
+
+				/*
+				 * Check to make sure we've actually finished our exchange (or
+				 * else that the user has allowed an authentication-less
+				 * connection).
+				 *
+				 * If the user has allowed both SCRAM and unauthenticated
+				 * (trust) connections, then this check will silently accept
+				 * partial SCRAM exchanges, where a misbehaving server does
+				 * not provide its verifier before sending an OK.  This is
+				 * consistent with historical behavior, but it may be a point
+				 * to revisit in the future, since it could allow a server
+				 * that doesn't know the user's password to silently harvest
+				 * material for a brute force attack.
+				 */
+				if (!conn->auth_required || conn->client_finished_auth)
+					break;
+
+				/*
+				 * No explicit authentication request was made by the server
+				 * -- or perhaps it was made and not completed, in the case of
+				 * SCRAM -- but there is one special case to check.  If the
+				 * user allowed "gss", then a GSS-encrypted channel also
+				 * satisfies the check.
+				 */
+#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
+				if (auth_method_allowed(conn, AUTH_REQ_GSS) && conn->gssenc)
+				{
+					/*
+					 * If implicit GSS auth has already been performed via GSS
+					 * encryption, we don't need to have performed an
+					 * AUTH_REQ_GSS exchange.  This allows require_auth=gss to
+					 * be combined with gssencmode, since there won't be an
+					 * explicit authentication request in that case.
+					 */
+				}
+				else
+#endif
+				{
+					reason = libpq_gettext("server did not complete authentication");
+					result = false;
+				}
+
+				break;
+
+			case AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD:
+			case AUTH_REQ_MD5:
+			case AUTH_REQ_GSS:
+			case AUTH_REQ_GSS_CONT:
+			case AUTH_REQ_SSPI:
+			case AUTH_REQ_SCM_CREDS:
+			case AUTH_REQ_SASL:
+			case AUTH_REQ_SASL_CONT:
+			case AUTH_REQ_SASL_FIN:
+
+				/*
+				 * We don't handle these with the default case, to avoid
+				 * bit-shifting past the end of the allowed_auth_methods mask
+				 * if the server sends an unexpected AuthRequest.
+				 */
+				result = auth_method_allowed(conn, areq);
+				break;
+
+			default:
+				result = false;
+				break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!result)
+	{
+		if (!reason)
+			reason = auth_method_description(areq);
+
+		libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "auth method \"%s\" requirement failed: %s",
+								conn->require_auth, reason);
+		return result;
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * When channel_binding=require, we must protect against two cases: (1) we
@@ -1008,6 +1144,9 @@ pg_fe_sendauth(AuthRequest areq, int payloadlen, PGconn *conn)
 										 "fe_sendauth: error sending password authentication\n");
 					return STATUS_ERROR;
 				}
+
+				/* We expect no further authentication requests. */
+				conn->client_finished_auth = true;
 				break;
 			}