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authorPeter Eisentraut <peter_e@gmx.net>2018-04-02 11:34:52 -0400
committerPeter Eisentraut <peter_e@gmx.net>2018-04-02 11:37:40 -0400
commit2764d5dcfa84d240c901c20ec6e194f72d82b78a (patch)
tree2db3da15bec088237b5b32f83de90c8cc8817e9b /src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
parent7e0d64c7a57e28fbcf093b6da9310a38367c1d75 (diff)
downloadpostgresql-2764d5dcfa84d240c901c20ec6e194f72d82b78a.tar.gz
postgresql-2764d5dcfa84d240c901c20ec6e194f72d82b78a.zip
Make be-secure-common.c more consistent for future SSL implementations
Recent commit 8a3d9425 has introduced be-secure-common.c, which is aimed at including backend-side APIs that can be used by any SSL implementation. The purpose is similar to fe-secure-common.c for the frontend-side APIs. However, this has forgotten to include check_ssl_key_file_permissions() in the move, which causes a double dependency between be-secure.c and be-secure-openssl.c. Refactor the code in a more logical way. This also puts into light an API which is usable by future SSL implementations for permissions on SSL key files. Author: Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c')
-rw-r--r--src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c69
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 69 deletions
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
index fb1f6b5bbe7..edfe2c0751c 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
@@ -18,12 +18,10 @@
#include "postgres.h"
-#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_TCP_H
@@ -320,70 +318,3 @@ secure_raw_write(Port *port, const void *ptr, size_t len)
return n;
}
-
-bool
-check_ssl_key_file_permissions(const char *ssl_key_file, bool isServerStart)
-{
- int loglevel = isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG;
- struct stat buf;
-
- if (stat(ssl_key_file, &buf) != 0)
- {
- ereport(loglevel,
- (errcode_for_file_access(),
- errmsg("could not access private key file \"%s\": %m",
- ssl_key_file)));
- return false;
- }
-
- if (!S_ISREG(buf.st_mode))
- {
- ereport(loglevel,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
- errmsg("private key file \"%s\" is not a regular file",
- ssl_key_file)));
- return false;
- }
-
- /*
- * Refuse to load key files owned by users other than us or root.
- *
- * XXX surely we can check this on Windows somehow, too.
- */
-#if !defined(WIN32) && !defined(__CYGWIN__)
- if (buf.st_uid != geteuid() && buf.st_uid != 0)
- {
- ereport(loglevel,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
- errmsg("private key file \"%s\" must be owned by the database user or root",
- ssl_key_file)));
- return false;
- }
-#endif
-
- /*
- * Require no public access to key file. If the file is owned by us,
- * require mode 0600 or less. If owned by root, require 0640 or less to
- * allow read access through our gid, or a supplementary gid that allows
- * to read system-wide certificates.
- *
- * XXX temporarily suppress check when on Windows, because there may not
- * be proper support for Unix-y file permissions. Need to think of a
- * reasonable check to apply on Windows. (See also the data directory
- * permission check in postmaster.c)
- */
-#if !defined(WIN32) && !defined(__CYGWIN__)
- if ((buf.st_uid == geteuid() && buf.st_mode & (S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO)) ||
- (buf.st_uid == 0 && buf.st_mode & (S_IWGRP | S_IXGRP | S_IRWXO)))
- {
- ereport(loglevel,
- (errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
- errmsg("private key file \"%s\" has group or world access",
- ssl_key_file),
- errdetail("File must have permissions u=rw (0600) or less if owned by the database user, or permissions u=rw,g=r (0640) or less if owned by root.")));
- return false;
- }
-#endif
-
- return true;
-}