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| author | Noah Misch <noah@leadboat.com> | 2020-11-09 07:32:09 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Noah Misch <noah@leadboat.com> | 2020-11-09 07:32:09 -0800 |
| commit | 0c3185e963d9f9dd0608214f7d732b84aa0888fe (patch) | |
| tree | e12049825b26d0190b69ae3dad84391a11542f79 /src/backend/commands/portalcmds.c | |
| parent | 8f113698b63b15a4e0a4b15d3ee37238c1d1821d (diff) | |
| download | postgresql-0c3185e963d9f9dd0608214f7d732b84aa0888fe.tar.gz postgresql-0c3185e963d9f9dd0608214f7d732b84aa0888fe.zip | |
In security-restricted operations, block enqueue of at-commit user code.
Specifically, this blocks DECLARE ... WITH HOLD and firing of deferred
triggers within index expressions and materialized view queries. An
attacker having permission to create non-temp objects in at least one
schema could execute arbitrary SQL functions under the identity of the
bootstrap superuser. One can work around the vulnerability by disabling
autovacuum and not manually running ANALYZE, CLUSTER, REINDEX, CREATE
INDEX, VACUUM FULL, or REFRESH MATERIALIZED VIEW. (Don't restore from
pg_dump, since it runs some of those commands.) Plain VACUUM (without
FULL) is safe, and all commands are fine when a trusted user owns the
target object. Performance may degrade quickly under this workaround,
however. Back-patch to 9.5 (all supported versions).
Reviewed by Robert Haas. Reported by Etienne Stalmans.
Security: CVE-2020-25695
Diffstat (limited to 'src/backend/commands/portalcmds.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/backend/commands/portalcmds.c | 5 |
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/backend/commands/portalcmds.c b/src/backend/commands/portalcmds.c index e4b7483e321..0b64204975d 100644 --- a/src/backend/commands/portalcmds.c +++ b/src/backend/commands/portalcmds.c @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ #include "commands/portalcmds.h" #include "executor/executor.h" #include "executor/tstoreReceiver.h" +#include "miscadmin.h" #include "rewrite/rewriteHandler.h" #include "tcop/pquery.h" #include "tcop/tcopprot.h" @@ -65,6 +66,10 @@ PerformCursorOpen(ParseState *pstate, DeclareCursorStmt *cstmt, ParamListInfo pa */ if (!(cstmt->options & CURSOR_OPT_HOLD)) RequireTransactionBlock(isTopLevel, "DECLARE CURSOR"); + else if (InSecurityRestrictedOperation()) + ereport(ERROR, + (errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE), + errmsg("cannot create a cursor WITH HOLD within security-restricted operation"))); /* * Parse analysis was done already, but we still have to run the rule |