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authorTom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>2020-12-28 17:44:17 -0500
committerTom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>2020-12-28 17:44:17 -0500
commit622ae4621ece72a9f64b5602c74d7aaf373c1631 (patch)
tree467f643f181e5784f01ef02694a4452e69a611a0 /doc/src
parentff6ce9a3a691a96e8e47ed449bc51c5a178e6931 (diff)
downloadpostgresql-622ae4621ece72a9f64b5602c74d7aaf373c1631.tar.gz
postgresql-622ae4621ece72a9f64b5602c74d7aaf373c1631.zip
Fix assorted issues in backend's GSSAPI encryption support.
Unrecoverable errors detected by GSSAPI encryption can't just be reported with elog(ERROR) or elog(FATAL), because attempting to send the error report to the client is likely to lead to infinite recursion or loss of protocol sync. Instead make this code do what the SSL encryption code has long done, which is to just report any such failure to the server log (with elevel COMMERROR), then pretend we've lost the connection by returning errno = ECONNRESET. Along the way, fix confusion about whether message translation is done by pg_GSS_error() or its callers (the latter should do it), and make the backend version of that function work more like the frontend version. Avoid allocating the port->gss struct until it's needed; we surely don't need to allocate it in the postmaster. Improve logging of "connection authorized" messages with GSS enabled. (As part of this, I back-patched the code changes from dc11f31a1.) Make BackendStatusShmemSize() account for the GSS-related space that will be allocated by CreateSharedBackendStatus(). This omission could possibly cause out-of-shared-memory problems with very high max_connections settings. Remove arbitrary, pointless restriction that only GSS authentication can be used on a GSS-encrypted connection. Improve documentation; notably, document the fact that libpq now prefers GSS encryption over SSL encryption if both are possible. Per report from Mikael Gustavsson. Back-patch to v12 where this code was introduced. Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/e5b0b6ed05764324a2f3fe7acfc766d5@smhi.se
Diffstat (limited to 'doc/src')
-rw-r--r--doc/src/sgml/client-auth.sgml120
-rw-r--r--doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml19
-rw-r--r--doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml42
-rw-r--r--doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml12
4 files changed, 119 insertions, 74 deletions
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/client-auth.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/client-auth.sgml
index a0a9ac9eed5..9a5c9318cee 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/client-auth.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/client-auth.sgml
@@ -198,14 +198,6 @@ hostnogssenc <replaceable>database</replaceable> <replaceable>user</replaceabl
the <literal>hostgssenc</literal> record is ignored except for logging
a warning that it cannot match any connections.
</para>
-
- <para>
- Note that the only supported
- <link linkend="auth-methods">authentication methods</link> for use
- with <acronym>GSSAPI</acronym> encryption
- are <literal>gss</literal>, <literal>reject</literal>,
- and <literal>trust</literal>.
- </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -1201,14 +1193,13 @@ omicron bryanh guest1
<productname>GSSAPI</productname> is an industry-standard protocol
for secure authentication defined in
<ulink url="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2743">RFC 2743</ulink>.
-
<productname>PostgreSQL</productname>
- supports <productname>GSSAPI</productname> for use as either an encrypted,
- authenticated layer, or for authentication only.
+ supports <productname>GSSAPI</productname> for authentication,
+ communications encryption, or both.
<productname>GSSAPI</productname> provides automatic authentication
(single sign-on) for systems that support it. The authentication itself is
secure. If <productname>GSSAPI</productname> encryption
- (see <literal>hostgssenc</literal>) or <acronym>SSL</acronym> encryption are
+ or <acronym>SSL</acronym> encryption is
used, the data sent along the database connection will be encrypted;
otherwise, it will not.
</para>
@@ -1220,37 +1211,46 @@ omicron bryanh guest1
<para>
When <productname>GSSAPI</productname> uses
- <productname>Kerberos</productname>, it uses a standard principal
- in the format
+ <productname>Kerberos</productname>, it uses a standard service
+ principal (authentication identity) name in the format
<literal><replaceable>servicename</replaceable>/<replaceable>hostname</replaceable>@<replaceable>realm</replaceable></literal>.
- The PostgreSQL server will accept any principal that is included in the keytab used by
- the server, but care needs to be taken to specify the correct principal details when
- making the connection from the client using the <literal>krbsrvname</literal> connection parameter. (See
- also <xref linkend="libpq-paramkeywords"/>.) The installation default can be
- changed from the default <literal>postgres</literal> at build time using
- <literal>./configure --with-krb-srvnam=</literal><replaceable>whatever</replaceable>.
- In most environments,
- this parameter never needs to be changed.
- Some Kerberos implementations might require a different service name,
- such as Microsoft Active Directory which requires the service name
- to be in upper case (<literal>POSTGRES</literal>).
- </para>
- <para>
- <replaceable>hostname</replaceable> is the fully qualified host name of the
- server machine. The service principal's realm is the preferred realm
- of the server machine.
- </para>
-
- <para>
- Client principals can be mapped to different <productname>PostgreSQL</productname>
- database user names with <filename>pg_ident.conf</filename>. For example,
+ The principal name used by a particular installation is not encoded in
+ the <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> server in any way; rather it
+ is specified in the <firstterm>keytab</firstterm> file that the server
+ reads to determine its identity. If multiple principals are listed in
+ the keytab file, the server will accept any one of them.
+ The server's realm name is the preferred realm specified in the Kerberos
+ configuration file(s) accessible to the server.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ When connecting, the client must know the principal name of the server
+ it intends to connect to. The <replaceable>servicename</replaceable>
+ part of the principal is ordinarily <literal>postgres</literal>,
+ but another value can be selected via <application>libpq</application>'s
+ <xref linkend="libpq-connect-krbsrvname"/> connection parameter.
+ The <replaceable>hostname</replaceable> part is the fully qualified
+ host name that <application>libpq</application> is told to connect to.
+ The realm name is the preferred realm specified in the Kerberos
+ configuration file(s) accessible to the client.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ The client will also have a principal name for its own identity
+ (and it must have a valid ticket for this principal). To
+ use <productname>GSSAPI</productname> for authentication, the client
+ principal must be associated with
+ a <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> database user name.
+ The <filename>pg_ident.conf</filename> configuration file can be used
+ to map principals to user names; for example,
<literal>pgusername@realm</literal> could be mapped to just <literal>pgusername</literal>.
Alternatively, you can use the full <literal>username@realm</literal> principal as
the role name in <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> without any mapping.
</para>
<para>
- <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> also supports a parameter to strip the realm from
+ <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> also supports mapping
+ client principals to user names by just stripping the realm from
the principal. This method is supported for backwards compatibility and is
strongly discouraged as it is then impossible to distinguish different users
with the same user name but coming from different realms. To enable this,
@@ -1264,39 +1264,34 @@ omicron bryanh guest1
</para>
<para>
- Make sure that your server keytab file is readable (and preferably
- only readable, not writable) by the <productname>PostgreSQL</productname>
- server account. (See also <xref linkend="postgres-user"/>.) The location
- of the key file is specified by the <xref
+ The location of the server's keytab file is specified by the <xref
linkend="guc-krb-server-keyfile"/> configuration
parameter. The default is
- <filename>/usr/local/pgsql/etc/krb5.keytab</filename> (or whatever
- directory was specified as <varname>sysconfdir</varname> at build time).
+ <filename>FILE:/usr/local/pgsql/etc/krb5.keytab</filename>
+ (where the directory part is whatever was specified
+ as <varname>sysconfdir</varname> at build time).
For security reasons, it is recommended to use a separate keytab
just for the <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> server rather
- than opening up permissions on the system keytab file.
+ than allowing the server to read the system keytab file.
+ Make sure that your server keytab file is readable (and preferably
+ only readable, not writable) by the <productname>PostgreSQL</productname>
+ server account. (See also <xref linkend="postgres-user"/>.)
</para>
+
<para>
- The keytab file is generated by the Kerberos software; see the
- Kerberos documentation for details. The following example is
- for MIT-compatible Kerberos 5 implementations:
+ The keytab file is generated using the Kerberos software; see the
+ Kerberos documentation for details. The following example shows
+ doing this using the <application>kadmin</application> tool of
+ MIT-compatible Kerberos 5 implementations:
<screen>
-<prompt>kadmin% </prompt><userinput>ank -randkey postgres/server.my.domain.org</userinput>
+<prompt>kadmin% </prompt><userinput>addprinc -randkey postgres/server.my.domain.org</userinput>
<prompt>kadmin% </prompt><userinput>ktadd -k krb5.keytab postgres/server.my.domain.org</userinput>
</screen>
</para>
<para>
- When connecting to the database make sure you have a ticket for a
- principal matching the requested database user name. For example, for
- database user name <literal>fred</literal>, principal
- <literal>fred@EXAMPLE.COM</literal> would be able to connect. To also allow
- principal <literal>fred/users.example.com@EXAMPLE.COM</literal>, use a user name
- map, as described in <xref linkend="auth-username-maps"/>.
- </para>
-
- <para>
- The following configuration options are supported for <productname>GSSAPI</productname>:
+ The following authentication options are supported for
+ the <productname>GSSAPI</productname> authentication method:
<variablelist>
<varlistentry>
<term><literal>include_realm</literal></term>
@@ -1319,7 +1314,7 @@ omicron bryanh guest1
<term><literal>map</literal></term>
<listitem>
<para>
- Allows for mapping between system and database user names. See
+ Allows mapping from client principals to database user names. See
<xref linkend="auth-username-maps"/> for details. For a GSSAPI/Kerberos
principal, such as <literal>username@EXAMPLE.COM</literal> (or, less
commonly, <literal>username/hostbased@EXAMPLE.COM</literal>), the
@@ -1346,6 +1341,15 @@ omicron bryanh guest1
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ In addition to these settings, which can be different for
+ different <filename>pg_hba.conf</filename> entries, there is the
+ server-wide <xref linkend="guc-krb-caseins-users"/> configuration
+ parameter. If that is set to true, client principals are matched to
+ user map entries case-insensitively. <literal>krb_realm</literal>, if
+ set, is also matched case-insensitively.
+ </para>
</sect1>
<sect1 id="sspi-auth">
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
index 67c5d4c36bd..a5db58d4680 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml
@@ -1581,6 +1581,16 @@ postgresql://%2Fvar%2Flib%2Fpostgresql/dbname
connection.<indexterm><primary>SSL</primary><secondary
sortas="libpq">with libpq</secondary></indexterm>
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ Note that if <acronym>GSSAPI</acronym> encryption is possible,
+ that will be used in preference to <acronym>SSL</acronym>
+ encryption, regardless of the value of <literal>sslmode</literal>.
+ To force use of <acronym>SSL</acronym> encryption in an
+ environment that has working <acronym>GSSAPI</acronym>
+ infrastructure (such as a Kerberos server), also
+ set <literal>gssencmode</literal> to <literal>disable</literal>.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -1784,6 +1794,15 @@ postgresql://%2Fvar%2Flib%2Fpostgresql/dbname
This must match the service name specified in the server
configuration for Kerberos authentication to succeed. (See also
<xref linkend="gssapi-auth"/>.)
+ The default value is normally <literal>postgres</literal>,
+ but that can be changed when
+ building <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> via
+ the <option>--with-krb-srvnam</option> option
+ of <application>configure</application>.
+ In most environments, this parameter never needs to be changed.
+ Some Kerberos implementations might require a different service name,
+ such as Microsoft Active Directory which requires the service name
+ to be in upper case (<literal>POSTGRES</literal>).
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml
index 4899bacda7b..98b42bb2692 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml
@@ -1454,6 +1454,10 @@ SELCT 1/0;<!-- this typo is intentional -->
<acronym>SSL</acronym>-encrypted. To continue after
<literal>N</literal>, send the usual StartupMessage and proceed without
encryption.
+ (Alternatively, it is permissible to issue a GSSENCRequest message
+ after an <literal>N</literal> response to try to
+ use <acronym>GSSAPI</acronym> encryption instead
+ of <acronym>SSL</acronym>.)
</para>
<para>
@@ -1509,20 +1513,14 @@ SELCT 1/0;<!-- this typo is intentional -->
result from the server, until it returns no output. When sending the
results of <function>gss_init_sec_context()</function> to the server,
prepend the length of the message as a four byte integer in network byte
- order. If this is successful, then use <function>gss_wrap()</function> to
- encrypt the usual StartupMessage and all subsequent data, prepending the
- length of the result from <function>gss_wrap()</function> as a four byte
- integer in network byte order to the actual encrypted payload. Note that
- the server will only accept encrypted packets from the client which are less
- than 16kB; <function>gss_wrap_size_limit()</function> should be used by the
- client to determine the size of the unencrypted message which will fit
- within this limit and larger messages should be broken up into multiple
- <function>gss_wrap()</function> calls. Typical segments are 8kB of
- unencrypted data, resulting in encrypted packets of slightly larger than 8kB
- but well within the 16kB maximum. The server can be expected to not send
- encrypted packets of larger than 16kB to the client. To continue after
+ order.
+ To continue after
<literal>N</literal>, send the usual StartupMessage and proceed without
encryption.
+ (Alternatively, it is permissible to issue an SSLRequest message
+ after an <literal>N</literal> response to try to
+ use <acronym>SSL</acronym> encryption instead
+ of <acronym>GSSAPI</acronym>.)
</para>
<para>
@@ -1532,9 +1530,7 @@ SELCT 1/0;<!-- this typo is intentional -->
support to <productname>PostgreSQL</productname>. In this case the
connection must be closed, but the frontend might choose to open a fresh
connection and proceed without requesting <acronym>GSSAPI</acronym>
- encryption. Given the length limits specified above, the ErrorMessage can
- not be confused with a proper response from the server with an appropriate
- length.
+ encryption.
</para>
<para>
@@ -1543,6 +1539,22 @@ SELCT 1/0;<!-- this typo is intentional -->
</para>
<para>
+ Once <acronym>GSSAPI</acronym> encryption has been successfully
+ established, use <function>gss_wrap()</function> to
+ encrypt the usual StartupMessage and all subsequent data, prepending the
+ length of the result from <function>gss_wrap()</function> as a four byte
+ integer in network byte order to the actual encrypted payload. Note that
+ the server will only accept encrypted packets from the client which are less
+ than 16kB; <function>gss_wrap_size_limit()</function> should be used by the
+ client to determine the size of the unencrypted message which will fit
+ within this limit and larger messages should be broken up into multiple
+ <function>gss_wrap()</function> calls. Typical segments are 8kB of
+ unencrypted data, resulting in encrypted packets of slightly larger than 8kB
+ but well within the 16kB maximum. The server can be expected to not send
+ encrypted packets of larger than 16kB to the client.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
While the protocol itself does not provide a way for the server to
force <acronym>GSSAPI</acronym> encryption, the administrator can
configure the server to reject unencrypted sessions as a byproduct
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
index 17e938148c5..283352d3a4a 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
@@ -2563,7 +2563,7 @@ openssl x509 -req -in server.csr -text -days 365 \
<productname>PostgreSQL</productname> also has native support for
using <acronym>GSSAPI</acronym> to encrypt client/server communications for
increased security. Support requires that a <acronym>GSSAPI</acronym>
- implementation (such as MIT krb5) is installed on both client and server
+ implementation (such as MIT Kerberos) is installed on both client and server
systems, and that support in <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> is
enabled at build time (see <xref linkend="installation"/>).
</para>
@@ -2583,6 +2583,16 @@ openssl x509 -req -in server.csr -text -days 365 \
</para>
<para>
+ When using <acronym>GSSAPI</acronym> for encryption, it is common to
+ use <acronym>GSSAPI</acronym> for authentication as well, since the
+ underlying mechanism will determine both client and server identities
+ (according to the <acronym>GSSAPI</acronym> implementation) in any
+ case. But this is not required;
+ another <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> authentication method
+ can be chosen to perform additional verification.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
Other than configuration of the negotiation
behavior, <acronym>GSSAPI</acronym> encryption requires no setup beyond
that which is necessary for GSSAPI authentication. (For more information