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authorSergey Kandaurov <pluknet@nginx.com>2025-01-22 18:55:44 +0400
committerpluknet <pluknet@nginx.com>2025-02-05 20:11:42 +0400
commit46b9f5d389447b3b822ea71f5ac86ebc316c2975 (patch)
tree0e0b53b482a13f3846c519d778907bc2dc795f24 /src/http/ngx_http_request.c
parent22a2a225ba87029f0e7bbc09a80ff7cdad23399d (diff)
downloadnginx-46b9f5d389447b3b822ea71f5ac86ebc316c2975.tar.gz
nginx-46b9f5d389447b3b822ea71f5ac86ebc316c2975.zip
SNI: added restriction for TLSv1.3 cross-SNI session resumption.
In OpenSSL, session resumption always happens in the default SSL context, prior to invoking the SNI callback. Further, unlike in TLSv1.2 and older protocols, SSL_get_servername() returns values received in the resumption handshake, which may be different from the value in the initial handshake. Notably, this makes the restriction added in b720f650b insufficient for sessions resumed with different SNI server name. Considering the example from b720f650b, previously, a client was able to request example.org by presenting a certificate for example.org, then to resume and request example.com. The fix is to reject handshakes resumed with a different server name, if verification of client certificates is enabled in a corresponding server configuration.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/http/ngx_http_request.c')
-rw-r--r--src/http/ngx_http_request.c27
1 files changed, 25 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/src/http/ngx_http_request.c b/src/http/ngx_http_request.c
index 0be9da95e..ceac8d307 100644
--- a/src/http/ngx_http_request.c
+++ b/src/http/ngx_http_request.c
@@ -932,6 +932,31 @@ ngx_http_ssl_servername(ngx_ssl_conn_t *ssl_conn, int *ad, void *arg)
goto done;
}
+ sscf = ngx_http_get_module_srv_conf(cscf->ctx, ngx_http_ssl_module);
+
+#if (defined TLS1_3_VERSION \
+ && !defined LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
+
+ /*
+ * SSL_SESSION_get0_hostname() is only available in OpenSSL 1.1.1+,
+ * but servername being negotiated in every TLSv1.3 handshake
+ * is only returned in OpenSSL 1.1.1+ as well
+ */
+
+ if (sscf->verify) {
+ const char *hostname;
+
+ hostname = SSL_SESSION_get0_hostname(SSL_get0_session(ssl_conn));
+
+ if (hostname != NULL && ngx_strcmp(hostname, servername) != 0) {
+ c->ssl->handshake_rejected = 1;
+ *ad = SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+#endif
+
hc->ssl_servername = ngx_palloc(c->pool, sizeof(ngx_str_t));
if (hc->ssl_servername == NULL) {
goto error;
@@ -945,8 +970,6 @@ ngx_http_ssl_servername(ngx_ssl_conn_t *ssl_conn, int *ad, void *arg)
ngx_set_connection_log(c, clcf->error_log);
- sscf = ngx_http_get_module_srv_conf(hc->conf_ctx, ngx_http_ssl_module);
-
c->ssl->buffer_size = sscf->buffer_size;
if (sscf->ssl.ctx) {