From 08fa47c4850cea32c3116665975bca219fbf2fe6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Noah Misch Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2015 10:06:29 -0400 Subject: Prevent stack overflow in json-related functions. Sufficiently-deep recursion heretofore elicited a SIGSEGV. If an application constructs PostgreSQL json or jsonb values from arbitrary user input, application users could have exploited this to terminate all active database connections. That applies to 9.3, where the json parser adopted recursive descent, and later versions. Only row_to_json() and array_to_json() were at risk in 9.2, both in a non-security capacity. Back-patch to 9.2, where the json type was introduced. Oskari Saarenmaa, reviewed by Michael Paquier. Security: CVE-2015-5289 --- src/backend/utils/adt/json.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) (limited to 'src/backend/utils/adt/json.c') diff --git a/src/backend/utils/adt/json.c b/src/backend/utils/adt/json.c index eefe93bc8ab..f394942bc35 100644 --- a/src/backend/utils/adt/json.c +++ b/src/backend/utils/adt/json.c @@ -490,6 +490,8 @@ parse_object(JsonLexContext *lex, JsonSemAction *sem) json_struct_action oend = sem->object_end; JsonTokenType tok; + check_stack_depth(); + if (ostart != NULL) (*ostart) (sem->semstate); @@ -568,6 +570,8 @@ parse_array(JsonLexContext *lex, JsonSemAction *sem) json_struct_action astart = sem->array_start; json_struct_action aend = sem->array_end; + check_stack_depth(); + if (astart != NULL) (*astart) (sem->semstate); @@ -1433,6 +1437,8 @@ datum_to_json(Datum val, bool is_null, StringInfo result, char *outputstr; text *jsontext; + check_stack_depth(); + /* callers are expected to ensure that null keys are not passed in */ Assert(!(key_scalar && is_null)); -- cgit v1.2.3